地方政府和中小企业关于金融扶持中小企业政策的博弈——基于互联网金融、供给侧结构性改革背景下不完全信息动态模型

Game between Local Governments and Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises on Financial Support Policy for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises——Incomplete Information Dynamic Model Based on Internet Finance and Supply-Side Structural Reform

中小企业作为中国经济的中坚力量在金融信贷上饱受歧视。中小企业需要地方政府提供金融信贷支持。地方政府出于对其地方经济贡献以及个人政绩考虑,往往将信贷资源留给国有企业和大型企业。互联网金融的发展和供给侧改革的深入使得地方政府给予中小企业资金支持的成本和收益发生了变化,中小企业和地方政府关于金融扶持的博弈便会发生变化。基于不完全信息动态模型,分析了中小企业和地方政府在博弈过程中的策略和收益,对于改善中小企业融资约束,深入推进供给侧结构性改革具有重要意义。

Small and medium-sized enterprises(SMES),as the backbone of China’s economy,suffer from discrimination in financial credit.SMES need financial credit support from local governments.Local governments tend to leave credit resources to state-owned enterprises and large enterprises for their contributions to the local economy and personal achievements.With the development of Internet finance and the deepening of supply-side structural reform,the costs and benefits of financial support for SMES by local governments have changed,and the game between SMES and local governments on financial support for SMES will change.Based on the incomplete information dynamic model,this paper analyzes the strategies and benefits of SMES and local governments in the game process,which is of great significance for improving SMES’financing constraints and deepening supply-side structural reform.