代理冲突、激励约束机制与并购商誉

A Research on the Relationship between Agency Conflict,Incentive and Restraint Mechanism and Corporate Goodwill

基于委托代理框架,主要研究管理层代理冲突及内外治理机制对企业并购活动中的商誉形成及其规模的影响。以2012—2017年A股上市公司为样本,实证检验发现,管理层代理冲突越严重的公司,通过并购形成的商誉规模越大,表明企业商誉确实包含了非经济的泡沫成分。深入研究表明,有效的内部激励机制与外部治理约束机制可以弱化管理层代理冲突与商誉规模之间的关系。进一步研究发现,代理冲突严重的公司,其商誉更可能在后续期间出现大的减值以及在公司绩效上有负的反映。该发现有助于进一步客观认识商誉的会计信息含量,帮助企业采取有效的公司治理机制来约束商誉中非合理部分的形成,从而降低企业风险。

Based on the principal-agent framework,this paper mainly studies the influence of agency conflicts and internal and external governance mechanism on goodwill formation and scale in M&A activities.Taking A-share listed companies from 2012 to 2017 as samples,the empirical test shows that the more serious the management agency conflict is,the larger the scale of goodwill formed through merger and acquisition will be,indicating that corporate goodwill does contain non-economic bubbles.Further research shows that effective internal incentive mechanism and external governance constraint mechanism can weaken the relationship between management agency conflict and goodwill scale.Companies with large agency conflicts are more likely to have a large impairment of goodwill in the subsequent period and negative reflection of corporate performance.The findings are helpful for further objective understanding of the accounting information content of goodwill,and help enterprises to take effective corporate governance mechanism to restrain the formation of unreasonable part of goodwill,so as to reduce the risk of enterprises.