独立董事薪酬激励与上市公司信息披露违规

Compensation Incentives of Independent Director and Information Disclosure Frauds of Listed Companies

以2007—2018年间中国A股上市公司为样本,从上市公司信息披露违规的视角研究了独立董事薪酬激励的公司治理效应与资本市场溢出效应。研究发现:独立董事薪酬激励与上市公司信息披露违规行为之间存在U型相关关系,表明过高或过低的独立董事薪酬激励水平都不能有助于抑制公司信息披露违规行为。机制检验发现,独立董事履职效率以及公司盈余质量的非线性变化,是上述U型相关关系产生的重要原因。进一步研究发现,当金融分析师关注度较低以及外部审计质量较差时,上述U型相关关系更加显著,表明独立董事与分析师、审计师在监督治理方面存在替代效应;当公司外部监督环境较差时,货币薪酬对独立董事的激励效应会更加突出。

Taking Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2018 as a sample,this paper studies corporate governance effects and the capital market spillover effects of compensation incentives for independent directors from the perspective of information disclosure frauds of listed companies.This paper finds that there is a U-shaped correlation between the compensation incentives of independent directors and the irregularities of information disclosure of listed companies,which indicates that too high or too low compensation incentives cannot help to restrain the illegal behavior of information disclosure.In the mechanism test,this paper finds that the non-linear changes of the performance efficiency of independent directors and the earnings quality of companies are the important reasons for the above U-shaped correlation.Further research finds that when analyst coverage and the quality of external audit is low,the above U-shaped correlation is more significant,indicating that independent directors have alternative effects on corporate supervision and governance among analysts and auditors.When the external supervision environment is poor,the incentive effect of monetary compensation on independent directors will be more prominent.