第二类代理问题与企业研发投入--基于中国制造业上市公司的实证分析

Type Ⅱ Agency Problem and Firm R&D Investment--An Empirical Analysis on Listed Manufacturing Companies in China

股权过度集中所引致的大股东与小股东间的委托代理冲突被视作第二类代理问题。本文基于2008~2018年我国上市公司数据,研究了第二类代理问题对企业研发投入的影响。结果发现:第二类代理问题会抑制上市公司的研发投入。存在实际控制人的上市公司研发强度显著低于无实际控制人的公司,且实际控制人控制权越大对研发投入强度的抑制作用越明显。对于民营企业以及新兴制造业企业而言,实际控制人对于研发投入的负面影响更为显著。机制检验表明,实际控制人的"掏空"行为会加剧企业融资约束,最终抑制其研发投入。本文认为,进一步健全上市公司外部治理机制,加强中小企业投资者保护,是改善第二类代理问题,提高企业创新研发的重要途经。本文的研究丰富了公司治理与企业创新的相关文献,为提高全社会企业创新动力,实现高质量经济发展提供了有益参考。

The principal-agent conflict between the major shareholder and the minority shareholder caused by the excessive concentration of equity is regarded as type Ⅱ agency problem.The article makes a theoretical analysis on how the type Ⅱ agency problem affects the R&D investment of listed companies.We use data on ownership and R&D of A-share listed companies from 2008 to 2018 to do empirical test.We find that:(1)companies with actual controllers whose R&D intensity is lower than those without actual controllers are,and the controllers’ right of control have a negative impact on R&D intensity.(2)Compared with state-owned enterprises,the actual controllers of private enterprises have a more significant inhibitory effect on R&D investment intensity.(3)Type Ⅱ agency problems have a more significant negative effect on the R&D investment of emerging manufacturing companies than those of traditional manufacturing industry.(4)Financial constraints have a mediating effect on the actual controller’s control and R&D investment intensity.The actual controller’s tunnelling will intensify the financial constraints and indirectly inhibit R&D investment.Based on the conclusions,we suggest much more attention should be paid to the second type Ⅱ agency problem and external governance have the same equivalent importance as easing financial constraints for encouraging R&D input.