外籍董事、管理层短视与企业创新——被调节的中介效应模型

Foreign Directors,Management Shortsightedness and Corporate Innovation—Regulated Mediation Effect Model

本文基于中国A股上市公司2008—2016年数据,通过构建一个有调节的中介效应模型,以深入探究外籍董事、管理层短视与企业创新之间的关系。研究结果表明:引入外籍董事有助于提升企业的创新产出水平和创新效率;外籍董事可以通过抑制管理层短视的路径来提升企业创新水平,管理层短视在外籍董事与企业创新之间具有部分中介效应的作用。政治关联负向调节了外籍董事与企业创新之间的关系,政治关联弱化了管理层短视对外籍董事与企业创新之间关系的部分中介作用。在考虑了内生性问题之后,上述研究结论依旧成立。该研究结论不仅对是否要引进外籍董事以及如何有效发挥外籍董事的积极作用提供了参考,还为如何解决管理层短视行为和正确认识政治关联的作用提供了新的思路。

Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2008 to 2016,this paper constructs a moderated intermediary effect model to explore the relationship among foreign directors,management shortsightedness and enterprise innovation.The results show that the introduction of foreign directors helps to improve the level of innovation output and innovation efficiency of corporate;foreign directors can improve the level of corporate innovation by restraining the management shortsightedness,which has a part of intermediary effect between foreign directors and corporate innovation.Political connections negatively regulate the relationship between foreign directors and corporate innovation,and political connections weaken part of the mediating role of managerial shortsightedness in the relationship between foreign directors and corporate innovation.After considering the endogenous problem,the above conclusions are still valid.The conclusion of this research not only provides a reference for the introduction of foreign directors and how to effectively play the positive role of foreign directors,but also understands how to solve the management shortsightedness behavior and correctly understand the role of political connections.