农村金融省联社模式改革路径研究——基于演化博弈模型

Approaches to Reforming in Provincial Rural Credit Union:Basesd on Evolutionary Game Theory Model

自2003年各省采用省级联社的农村信用管理制度以来,农村信用的改革方案长期被关注,农村信用管理权主体属于省联社还是金融监管部门是争论焦点。本文通过演化博弈模型分析双方动机、演化规律与均衡,研究表明:均衡依赖于双方的利益成本关系、基层行社的治理水平及风险预期,并且在演化过程中会出现“演化螺旋”的现象,无法通过观察双方短时间内的决策偏好来正确决策,因此更难制定符合均衡需求的改革方案。如无外力引导,改革将造成不必要的社会效率损失和不稳定。

It has been intensively discussed on the reform in rural credit system since 2003 when all the provinces adopted the provincial rural credit union as their managing regime.The main disputation is on the determination of whether the rural credit union or financial regulators should be in charge of the reform.This paper analyses the motivation,behaviour patterns and the equilibrium of both sides based on evolutionary game theory.The results shows that the equilibrium relies on their expectation on risk,profit-cost relationship with the rural banks and the management quality of local rural banks.Especially,an“evolutionary spiral”would appear during the game.And thus lead to difficuities in making the right decision by observing short-term behaviour of the counterparty,making it harder to craft reforms that meet balanced demands.Without proper external guiding,reform would possibly cause further instability and a loss in social efficiency.