摘要
提升企业产能利用率是治理当前中国制造业产能过剩问题的关键。利用中国大型微观数据系统地研究了政府补贴对企业产能利用率的影响及作用机制。研究发现,政府补贴在总体上显著提高了企业产能利用率,该效应具有持续性特征,并随补贴时间的延长呈现逐步增强的趋势。机制检验表明,生产效率提升与出口规模扩张是政府补贴提高企业产能利用率的重要渠道。进一步的异质性分析发现,政府补贴对民营企业、东部地区企业产能利用率的提升作用更大。最后,还考察了不同强度补贴对企业产能利用率的影响,发现只有中强度补贴显著提高了企业产能利用率,而高强度补贴则倾向于抑制企业产能利用率的提升;就此背后的机制进行了检验,发现高强度补贴会明显提高企业的寻租成本,产生了高昂的非生产性支出,从而不利于企业产能利用率的提高。从产能过剩治理角度深入地评估了政府补贴的经济效应,一方面丰富了政府补贴与企业行为的研究,另一方面为治理产能过剩和提升企业产能利用率提供了新思路。
Improving the utilization rate of enterprises’ capacity is the key to solve the problem of overcapacity in China’s manufacturing industry. This paper systematically studies the impact and mechanism of government subsidies on enterprises’ capacity utilization rate by using large-scale micro data in China. The study finds that in general,government subsidies significantly improve the utilization rate of enterprises’ capacity,which has the characteristics of sustainability,and gradually increases with the extension of subsidy time. The mechanism test shows that the promotion of production efficiency and the expansion of export scale are the important channels for the government subsidies to improve the capacity utilization rate of enterprises. Further heterogeneity analysis shows that the government subsidies play a greater role in improving the capacity utilization of private enterprises and enterprises in the eastern region. Finally,this study also examines the impact of different intensity subsidies on enterprises’ capacity utilization rate,and finds that only medium intensity subsidies can significantly improve enterprises’ capacity utilization rate,while high intensity subsidies tend to inhibit the improvement of enterprises’ capacity utilization rate;we examine the mechanism behind this,and find that high intensity subsidies can significantly increase the rent-seeking cost of enterprises,resulting in high non-productive expenditure,which is not conducive to the improvement of enterprises’ capacity utilization rate. This paper evaluates the economic effect of government subsidies from the perspective of overcapacity governance. On the one hand,it enriches the research of government subsidies and enterprise behavior. On the other hand,it provides a new way for the governance of overcapacity and the promotion of enterprises’ capacity utilization rate.
作者
曹亚军
毛其淋
CAO Yajun;MAO Qilin(School of International Economics and Trade,Henan University of Economics and Law,Zhengzhou 450046,China;School of Economics,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071,China)
出处
《产业经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第2期58-72,共14页
Industrial Economics Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71773055)
霍英东教育基金会高等院校青年教师基金项目(171075)
国家社会科学基金重大项目(18ZDA078)
国家社科基金后期资助项目(19FJYB049)。
关键词
政府补贴
产能利用率
寻租成本
生产率
出口
倾向得分匹配
government subsidy
capacity utilization rate
rent-seeking cost
productivity
export
propensity score matching