去杠杆政策是否与产业政策相冲突?——基于企业债务融资视角的实证考察

Whether Deleveraging Task Conflicts with Industrial Policy:An Empirical Study Based on Enterprises’Debt Structure

本文以2003~2016年沪深A股上市企业为研究样本,从企业债务融资的视角考察去杠杆政策与产业政策的潜在冲突问题,研究发现:去杠杆政策会降低企业金融负债比重,增加企业经营负债比重;而产业政策则相反,会增加企业金融负债比重,降低企业经营负债比重。进一步研究发现,产业政策带给企业的债务融资优势,包括增加金融负债融资和减少经营负债占用,在去杠杆政策施行期间会被削弱。因此,去杠杆政策与产业政策会发生冲突。在对样本进行分组测试后,本文还发现,上述冲突主要体现在中西部地区或市场化水平较低地区的企业样本中。

Based on A-share companies listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets exchanged from 2003 to 2016,this paper studies the potential conflicts between the deleveraging task and the industrial policy.This result shows that deleveraging policy will reduce the proportion of the company's financial liabilities and increase the proportion of the company's operating liabilities.And the industrial policy will,on the contrary,increase the proportion of the company's financial liabilities and reduce the proportion of the company's operating liabilities.Moreover,deleveraging policy will reduce the financing convenience brought by industrial policies to enterprises,and cause enterprises to seek to occupy operating liabilities such as trade credits.After group testing the samples,the result also shows that the conflict between the deleveraging task and the industrial policy is mainly reflected in the sample of enterprises from the central and western regions or provinces with lower degree of marketization.