油气管道核准中的企地冲突及中央政府协调机理研究——基于重复博弈模型的数理分析

Research on the conflicts between enterprises and local governments about oil&gas pipeline approval as well as the coordination mechanism of central government—Mathematical analysis based on repeated game model

中国油气管道项目在核准过程中,中央企业与地方政府会因为追求各自利益引发大量的冲突和博弈,进而拖延项目工期,拉高项目建设成本。运用博弈论对项目核准中各方的理性行为及相应结局进行分析,建立中央企业和地方政府的重复博弈模型,并通过对博弈收益矩阵贴现因子的优化,考察重复博弈合作均衡存在的条件以及引入奖惩机制对合作产生的促进效果。基于模型的理论分析结果,结合我国的实际情况,为促进油气管道核准的企地合作,提出了企地间管道项目收益公平分配、提高双方自身贴现因子、增加合作收益,以及优化管道项目核准体系并重视管道项目价值六个方面的研究结论与建议。

During the approval process of China's oil and gas pipeline projects,the central enterprises and local governments will pursue their interests respectively and then would lead to a lot of conflicts and games,delaying the project duration and driving up the construction cost.Based on the analysis of the rational behaviors of all parties involved in the approval process,this paper builds a repeated game model to investigate the equilibrium condition between central enterprises and local governments,and obtains the way how to promote the cooperation via optimizing the discount factor and introducing reward and punishment mechanism.Combining the theoretical results with the actual situation,it suggests providing the distribution of pipeline project income between enterprises and land tends to be fair and reasonable,promoting the increase of the discount factor between them,increasing the benefits of cooperation,optimizing pipeline project approval system,and attaching importance to pipeline project value.