期刊文献+

身份识别与嵌套社会困境下的决策——基于行为实验的研究

Identifying and Decision Making in Nested Social Dilemma Situations--Based on the Behavior Experimental Study
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摘要 基于行为决策理论与实验经济学的研究方法,设置2个规模大小不同的集体和2种身份信息显示的决策情境,在"个体-小集体-大集体"多层级嵌套组织模式下考察身份识别对合作行为的影响及其作用机制。结果表明,身份识别对当事人的合作行为有正向促进作用,但小集体中的识别效应强于大集体的,且部分挤出了大集体中的激励效应。进一步检验发现、组织层级在身份识别与合作行为之间存在调节效应;越是风险追求偏好的个体,身份识别对合作行为的促进效应越显著。 Based on behavioral decision theory and experimental economics research method,the decision situations which have two different size groups and two way of identity information display are set up.This study examines the incentive effect of identifying and its mechanism of cooperative behavior in the decision situation which has multi level nested on individuals,sub-collectives and large collectives.Results show that identifying has a significant positive effect on cooperative behavior,and stronger in sub-collectives than in large collectives.The incentive effect in large collectives has partial crowding out.After further testing,it finds that collectives’size had moderating effect between identifying effect and cooperative behavior,and the more risk-seeking individuals,the more significant effect of identity recognition.
作者 李朝阳 付晓改 李建标 LI Chao-yang;FU Xiao-gai;LI Jian-biao(Management School,Henan University of Technology,Zhengzhou 450001;School of Economics and Management,Zhengzhou University of Light Industry,Zhengzhou 450001;Academy of Corporate Governance,Nankai University,Tianjin 300071)
出处 《软科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2019年第8期114-119,共6页 Soft Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71602051) 河南省科技厅软科学计划项目(182400410199) 河南省高等学校重点科研项目(17A630014) 河南省教育厅人文社会科学研究一般项目(2017-ZZJH-089) 河南省高等学校哲学社会科学创新团队(2019-CXTD-04)。
关键词 身份识别 嵌套社会困境 合作行为 行为实验 identifying nested social dilemmas cooperative behavior behavior experiment
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