公司治理、管理层过度自信与可转债融资选择

Corporate Governance,Managerial Overconfidence and Convertible Bond Financing Selection

选取2002-2017年A股发行了可转债与进行了公开增发的上市公司为样本,研究公司治理、管理层过度自信与可转债融资选择三者的关系。实证结果表明:当选择可转债或股权融资时,过度自信的管理层比非过度自信的管理层选择可转债融资的概率更高;股权制衡度更低和董事长与总经理两职合一的公司选择可转债融资的概率更高。另外,健全的公司治理对管理层过长和总经理两职分离和提高董事会独立性的效果不佳。这对于探索公司治理和管理层过度自信影响可转债融资选择的作用机理以及完善上市公司公司治理机制等具有理论意义和实践价值。

This paper selects the listed companies that issued convertible bonds and implemented public issuance of A-shares from 2002 to 2017 as samples.The results show that:When choosing convertible bonds financing or equity financing,overconfident managers are more likely to choose convertible bonds financing than non-overconfident managers;the company that has lower the degree of check-and-balance of stock ownership and the company that adopt the policy of one person being both chairman and general manager is more likely to choose convertible bonds financing.In addition,the weakening effect of sound corporate governance on managerial overconfidence on convertible bond financing options is various,among which the increase of the degree of check-and-balance of stock ownership and board size is more effective,and the separation of chairman and general manager and the improvement of board independence are not very effective.This study enriches the research results of corporate governance,managerial overconfidence and convertible bond financing selection.