摘要
创新需要企业领导者发起和支持,当受到路径依赖和组织结构阻碍而难以创新时,企业可能依赖CEO继任以激发创新。作为CEO继任的核心问题,CEO继任来源如何影响企业创新,前期研究尚未达成一致结论。基于委托代理理论和人力资本专用性理论,分析CEO遴选过程,通过分析不同来源CEO继任者在继任情境下的企业创新决策机制,探索CEO外部继任对企业创新的影响机制以及前任CEO作为重要情境要素的调节作用。以2009—2016年沪深A股上市公司为样本,运用OLS、PSM模型和Heckman二阶段自选择模型进行检验,结果发现,CEO外部继任对企业创新绩效具有显著负效应;前任CEO的任期会减弱CEO外部继任对企业创新绩效的负效应;前任CEO强制离职会强化上述负效应。
In the context of CEO succession,the strengthened supervision of board of directors on the CEO successor might be caused by information asymmetry and inverse choice in the process of CEO selection which affects the CEO successor's strategic decision-making after succession.By considering corporate innovation as an essential strategic orientation,the paper focuses on the CEO selecting process to analyze the impact of CEO origin on corporate innovation and the moderating effect of the predecessor CEO.We use extensive longitudinal data from Chinese publicly traded companies in Shenzhen and Shanghai stock markets from 2009 to 2016 and employ OLS and Heckman two-stage regression to test our hypotheses.The results indicate that CEO outsider negatively affects corporate innovation,and the predecessor CEO's tenure would weaken the negative effect of CEO outsider on post-succession innovation while predecessor CEO's force turnover would strengthen the negative effect.Our findings enriches the research of CEO succession's effect on firm's strategy and that of CEO selection,thus bearing a meaningful insight on how to ensure a right CEO successor selection and the reasonable resource allocation on innovation in the context of CEO succession,which would undoubtedly is greatly helpful for the company acquire competitiveness in the long run.
作者
刘鑫
Liu Xin(School of Economics and Management,Hebei University of Technology,Tianjin 300401,China)
出处
《科技进步与对策》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第9期113-122,共10页
Science & Technology Progress and Policy
基金
国家社会科学基金一般项目(17BGL112)。
