基于主从博弈的电网公司需求响应补贴定价机制

Stackelberg Game Based Incentive Pricing Mechanism of Demand Response for Power Grid Corporations

文中构建了电网公司与多个用户的需求响应主从博弈模型。其中电网公司基于预测得到的下一年负荷持续曲线,选取合适时间段制定需求响应补贴策略,通过降低峰值负荷减少输配电建设成本,提高输配电整体收益;而用户根据电网公司在某时段制定的需求响应补贴价格决定在该时段的响应量来获取额外收益。文中对主从博弈模型的存在性及求解思路进行了分析,并给出了博弈均衡解的求解流程。算例表明,电网公司可基于所构建模型得到峰荷时段的补贴价格,且电网公司及用户均可通过需求响应而获益。此外算例还分析了可避免输配电容量单位成本变化对电网公司需求响应收益的影响。

A Stackelberg game model between a power grid corporation and multiple users is constructed for demand response.The power grid corporation selects the appropriate time period to formulate the subsidy strategy of demand response based on the predicted load duration curve of next year.The construction costs of power transmission and distribution are decreased by reducing the peak load,thereby the overall revenue of power transmission and distribution is improved.Users choose the response in electricity consumption based on the subsidy price of demand response during the time period set by the power grid corporation to obtain additional profits.Moreover,the existence of the Stackelberg game model and the idea for solving the model are analyzed,and the process of solving the game equilibrium solution is presented.Case study shows that the power grid corporation can declares subsidized price during peak load period based on the developed model.Both the power grid corporation and users can benefit from demand response.In addition,the impact of the unit cost change of avoidable power transmission and distribution capacity on profits of demand response for the power grid corporation is analyzed.