双边道德风险下共享平台两阶段博弈模型研究

Study on Two-Stage Game Model of Shared Platform Under Bilateral Moral Risk

借鉴双边市场理论和博弈论,构建上游企业、共享平台和下游企业三方两阶段动态博弈模型,分析具有双重身份的共享平台在双边道德风险下双重契约形成的内在机理。研究表明:上游企业和下游企业违约概率与其成本成反比,与违约惩罚成正比;上游企业对成本比较敏感,下游企业对违约惩罚比较敏感,并且上游企业违约概率高于下游企业;平台盈利模式的改变,不再靠押金或者较低的手续费,而是靠长期建立的双重契约和激励机制。

Based on the bilateral market theory and game theory, the author constructs a two-stage dynamic game model of upstream enterprises, sharing platform and downstream enterprises, and analyzes the internal mechanism of the design of double contracts by the sharing platform with dual identities under the bilateral moral risk. The study shows that the default probability of upstream and downstream enterprises is inversely proportional to their cost, and is positively proportional to the default penalty. Upstream enterprises are more sensitive to cost, while downstream enterprises are more sensitive to default punishment. The default probability of upstream enterprises is higher than that of downstream enterprises. The difference between production data sharing and consumption data is that the change of platform profit model is no longer by deposit or lower fee, but by long-term establishment of double contracts and incentive mechanism.