债务融资与企业创新效率——基于《物权法》自然实验的经验证据

An Empirical Research on Debt Finance and Corporate Innovation Efficiency

在资本市场发育程度不完善的背景下,债务融资是我国企业的主要融资渠道,会对企业创新效率产生重要影响。以2007年《物权法》的实施为外生事件,检验了《物权法》通过强化对债权人的保护以及扩大抵押品范围而扩大企业债务融资规模后,对企业创新效率的影响。自然实验的经验证据表明,债务融资提高了我国上市公司的创新效率。进一步研究发现,市场竞争程度在债务融资与企业创新效率的相关关系中起到正向调节作用,且相比于国企而言,债务融资对企业创新效率的提高作用在非国企更加显著。进一步的机制检验结果表明,债务融资通过抑制代理冲突提高企业创新效率。

Taking the implementation of the Property Law in 2007 as an exogenous event,this paper examines the impact of the Property Law on the innovation efficiency of enterprises after it expands the scale of debt financing by strengthening the protection of creditors and expanding the scope of collateral.The empirical evidence of natural experiments shows that debt financing improves the innovation efficiency of Listed Companies in China.Further research finds that the degree of market competition plays a positive regulatory role in the relationship between debt financing and enterprise innovation efficiency,and compared with state-owned enterprises,debt financing plays a more significant role in improving enterprise innovation efficiency in non-state-owned enterprises.Further mechanism test results show that debt financing can improve innovation efficiency by restraining agency conflicts.