党组织参与治理对国有上市公司盈余管理的影响

The Effect of Communist Party'Participation in Corporate Governance on Earnings Management:Evidence from State-Owned Enterprises

文章利用我国A股非金融类国有上市公司2009-2016年数据,以公司党组织成员是否同时兼任董事、监事或高级管理人员(“双向进入”)以及党委书记是否同时兼任董事长、监事会主席或总经理(“交叉任职”)两个指标衡量党组织通过“双向进入、交叉任职”制度参与企业治理的情况,检验了党组织参与治理对国有上市公司盈余管理行为的影响。结果发现,党组织通过“双向进入”、“交叉任职”参与公司治理可以显著抑制国有上市公司应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理行为。其中,对应计盈余管理而言,党组织参与治理对正向操纵盈余和负向操纵盈余行为均有显著的抑制作用;对真实盈余管理而言,党组织参与治理的抑制作用主要体现在异常生产成本和异常操控性费用两方面。这一研究有助于进一步理解和全面、客观评价党组织在国有企业中的治理作用。

By using the data of Chinese A-share listed companies for the period from 2009 to 2016,we investigate whether Communist Party of China(CPC)committee'participation in state-owned enterprises'(SOEs)corporate governance has an impact on earnings management.The results support the hypothesis that CPC committee'participation in corporate governance can decrease significantly both accrual-based and real activity-based earnings management.Specifically,both of the level of accrual-based earnings management and real activity-based earnings management are lower when there is at least a CPC committee member serves as director,supervisor or top manager(two-way entry)or the secretary of the CPC committee serves as the chairman of the board of the director,the chairman of supervisory board,or chief executive officer(cross-appointment).Further analysis demonstrates that:1)for accrual-based earnings management,CPC committee'participation in corporate governance is negatively associated with both upward and downward earnings manipulation;2)for real earnings management,CPC committee'participation in corporate governance is negatively associated with overproduction and expenses manipulation,but not with sales manipulation.This paper is helpful to assess the role of CPC committee's participation in corporate governance.