企业风险承担、所有制与诉讼结案方式

Corporate Risk-taking,Ownership and Litigation-ending Way

本文基于2000-2015年的企业诉讼数据,研究了企业风险承担对企业诉讼结案方式的影响,结果表明企业风险承担越低,企业越倾向于调解;反之,较高的企业风险承担会使企业倾向于选择判决。进一步地,两者关系因企业所有制的不同而产生差异。对国有企业而言,较高的风险承担会增强企业的调解意愿;而非国有企业在较高的风险承担水平下,则倾向于通过判决来维护自身利益。这一发现不仅拓宽了法经济学的研究思路,更重要的是在主张全面调解的背景下,为现行的“大调解”制度赋予了重要的政策含义,有助于企业更快解决纠纷,提高法院结案效率。

Based on the corporate litigation data from 2000 to 2015,the article studies the influence of corporate risk-taking on litigation-ending way.The result shows that corporate risk-taking strengthen the litigants'willingness of choosing settlement;on the contrary,higher corporate with higher risk-taking will prefer judgment in the litigation.Furthermore,the relationship varies with corporations'different ownerships.For the state-owned enterprises,higher risk-taking will lead to higher probability of settlement;while for the not-state-owned companies,high-level risk-taking companies tend to insist on judgment to protect their own interests.This finding not only broadens the researches of risk-taking and the economics of law,but also have policy implications under the“Comprehensive Settlement”background.It can help corporations deal with dispute more quickly and improve courts'litigation-ending efficiency.