考虑事故发生率的危险品物流企业运营监管研究

Research on the Supervision of Dangerous Goods Logistics Enterprises Operations with Consideration of Accident Rate

文章研究了考虑不同事故发生率的危险品物流企业运营监管问题,以演化博弈理论为基础,构建基于不同事故发生率的演化博弈模型,探讨了危险品物流不同事故发生率对演化博弈行为的影响,并对动态博弈的演化结果进行模拟仿真.研究结果发现:加大对危险品物流企业违法运营行为的惩罚力度,在短期内能够促使危险品物流企业守法运营,但是长期内则会驱动政府监管部门放松监管,反而增大了危险品物流企业违法运营的概率.因此,凡是危险品现场督查不力、敷衍了事的监管人员都应受到严惩.这样不仅短期内促进政府监管部门从严监管,而且长期内使得危险品物流企业违法运营明显减少.所研究成果为政府监管部门重视危险品物流企业运营活动监管体系建设,不断提升监管水平、强化监管责任提供新思路.

This paper studies the supervision of dangerous goods logistics enterprise operations with different accident rates.Using the evolutionary game theory,an evolutionary game model based on different accident rates is constructed,the influence of different accident rates on evolutionary game behavior is discussed,and the evolution results of dynamic games are simulated.The results show that increasing the punishment for illegal operation of dangerous goods logistics enterprises,can compel them to abide by the law in the short run.In the long run,it will cause regulatory authority to relax supervision,thereby increasing the law-breaking probabilities of dangerous goods logistics enterprises.On this score,a regulatory authority who is careless on the supervision of dangerous goods logistics enterprises should be punished.This will not only promote the strict supervision of the regulatory authorities in the short term but will significantly reduce the illegal activities in the long run.The results of this paper provide new ideas for the government departments to pay attention to the construction of the supervision system for the operational activities of dangerous goods logistics enterprises.Additionally,it is to improve the supervision level and strengthen supervision responsibility.