市场化进程、管理层激励与企业非效率投资的关系——基于2014-2018年上市公司数据

Marketization Process,Management Incentive and Inefficient Investment:Based on the Data of Listed Companies in 2014-2018

以2014-2018年沪深两市上市公司为初始研究样本,实证分析我国企业管理层激励与非效率投资的相关关系;引入管理层激励与市场化进程相对指标交乘项的做法,考察市场化进程这一动态过程本身将如何作用管理层激励对非效率投资的治理效应。研究发现:一是企业非效率投资与管理层货币薪酬总额、持股比例显著正相关,而非效率投资与管理层获得的非预期性货币薪酬显著负相关;二是市场化能对企业行为起到引导和改善作用,市场化进程作为企业外部治理环境因素,能引导企业调整自身行为、提升价值;三是市场化进程能降低管理层激励之于非效率投资的敏感性,通过间接作用和规范企业管理层的行为,使其投资行为更加理性化、合法化。

This paper takes the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets from 2014 to 2018 as the initial research samples,and empirically analyzes the relationship between management incentive and inefficient investment.It introduces the method of cross-referencing the relative indicators of management incentives and marketization process,and examines how the dynamic process of marketization process itself can affect the governance effect of management incentives on inefficient investment.The results show that there is a significant positive correlation between the inefficient investment and the total monetary compensation and the shareholding ratio of the management,while there is a significant negative correlation between the inefficient investment and the unexpected monetary compensation obtained by the management.Marketization can guide and improve the behavior of enterprises,and marketization process,as an external governance environment factor,can guide companies to adjust their behavior and increase value.The process of marketization can reduce the sensitivity of managers’incentive to inefficient investment,and make their investment behavior more rational and legal by indirectly acting and standardizing the behavior of managers.