资本监管、市场竞争与银行贷款结构

Capital Regulation,Market Competition,and Bank Loan Structure

选取中国101家商业银行2007~2017年的非平衡面板数据,运用随机前沿模型(SFA)分析资本监管和市场竞争对银行贷款规模及其结构的影响,同时通过系统GMM估计,对理论推论进行实证检验,结果表明:当资本监管放松时,有利于贷款增加,而且个人贷款比公司贷款更加敏感;市场竞争是一把"双刃剑",一方面会抑制信贷扩张,改善贷款结构,另一方面会降低银行的资本缓冲,提高银行风险水平;市场竞争将削弱资本缓冲对贷款的促进作用。建议监管部门充分利用市场竞争改变银行的贷款结构,并根据不同市场竞争水平对银行实施差异性监管。

This study selected the unbalanced panel data of 101 commercial banks in China from 2007 to 2017 and employed stochastic frontier analysis(SFA) to analyze the effects of capital regulation and market competition on the scale and structure of bank loans.Theoretical inferences were also empirically tested using system generalized method of moments(GMM) estimation.The following findings were obtained.Relaxing capital regulations facilitated an increase in loans,where personal loans were more sensitive than corporate loans in this respect.Market competition was a double-edged sword.On the one hand,market competition would inhibit credit expansion and improve loan structure.On the other hand,it would reduce the banks’ capital buffer and increase their risk level.Market competition would weaken the role of capital buffer in boosting loans.This study suggests that regulatory authorities make full use of market competition to change the loan structure of banks,and implement differentiated regulation of banks according to the level of competition in different markets.