我国地方政府金融监管的演化路径研究——基于前景理论

The Evolution Path of Financial Supervision of Local Governments in China: Based onProspect Theory

为深入探寻地方金融监管难的原因,本文将地方金融监管部门、金融机构、投资者三个利益主体纳入研究框架,采用动态演化理论,构建了基于前景理论三个利益主体的博弈模型,对我国地方金融监管的演化路径进行了研究,进而利用MATLAB软件对模型进行了数据模拟.模拟结果表明:地方金融监管部门、金融机构和投资者三者的决策行为是相互影响的.地方金融监管部门严格监管的成本、地方金融监管部门不严格监管时下降的公信力,金融机构自律的成本、政府对金融机构的补贴,投资者的鉴别成本、政府对投资者的补贴,是影响策略组合最终收敛于何种演化稳定状态的关键因素.

In order to further explore the reasons of local financial supervision difficulties, this article takes the local financial supervision departments, financial institutions and investors into the research framework. We use a dynamic evolution theory to build a game model based on the prospect theory, focus on the evolution path of local financial supervision in China. Then using MATLAB software to make a simulation. The simulation results show that: the decision-making behaviors of the local financial supervision departments, financial institutions and investors are interacted with each other. The costs of strict supervision by local financial regulators, the declining credibility resulted by the unstrict supervision of local financial supervision department, the costs of self-discipline of financial institutions, government subsidies to financial institutions, the costs of investor identification, and government subsidies to investors are the key factors that affect the ultimate convergence of the strategy portfolios in the evolution and stability state.