牧区水利设施治理中利益相关者的博弈机理研究--基于俱乐部物品属性的分析

Research on the Game Mechanism of Stakeholders in the Management of Water Conservancy Facilities in Pastoral Areas-Analysis Based on Club Item Attributes

通过构建俱乐部物品的一般模型,讨论俱乐部规模与最优设施规模的关系,证明特定种类的水利设施存在适度使用范围,再建立潜在政府供给条件下,俱乐部与牧民博弈的两种均衡,证明政府以较高价格供水能为市场化的高效完善与俱乐部治理提供基础。研究表明:政府治理、组织化治理和个人治理应同时存在,政府的干预可以帮助解决用水困难,但是完全依赖于政府,会让小规模水利设施供给不足,也会导致政府供给的水利设施超负荷运转。因此,政府干预应在保障生存权的前提下引导利益相关者关系向稳定组织关系演变。

Discuss the relationship between club size and optimal facility size by building a general model of club items,and proves that there is a moderate range of use of specific types of water conservancy facilities. Under the condition of establishing potential government supply,the two kinds of equilibrium between the club and the herdsmen prove that the government can provide a basis for the efficient and perfect marketization and club governance with higher price water supply. Research shows that government governance,organizational governance and personal governance should exist at the same time. Government intervention can help solve water shortage,but relying entirely on the government will make the supply of small-scale water conservancy facilities insufficient,and it will also lead to overload running of water supply facilities provided by the government. Therefore,government intervention should guide the evolution of stakeholder relations to stable organizational relations under the premise of guaranteeing the right to subsistence.