三维交易模式下企业协同低碳减排研究

Research on Enterprise Collaborative Low Carbon Emission Reduction under Three-Dimensional Trading Mode

低碳经济下企业的运作模式已由传统的资源-产品二维交易演化为资源-产品-碳排放权的三维交易模式,因此对三维交易模式下企业协同减排的研究变的越来越重要。本文利用Stackelberg博弈理论探讨了销售商驱动情景下低碳再制造闭环供应链分散决策模型、集中决策模型、合作减排模型的运作规律,分析研究了低碳产品市场和废旧产品市场中低碳产品销售价、交易价格、低碳废旧产品回收价格等重要变量和节点企业期望效用及整个链条期望效用的变化规律。并通过数值算例与灵敏度分析,分别对三种博弈关系下低碳产品的碳排放量、消费者的敏感系数、碳交易价格的变动带来的销售商和制造商的期望效用及销售价、批发价带来的影响进行了分析。研究显示:与非低碳化相比,低碳化下制造商和销售商的期望效用均提高;风险规避程度、碳排放交易价格、碳排放量及消费者对低碳产品的敏感系数的提高均降低了期望效用,同时市场占有率随之减少。研究验证了低碳再制造闭环供应链模型的有效性及实用性,彰显了模型的经济与管理启示。

Under the low-carbon economy, the supply chain node enterprise transaction model has evolved from the traditional resource-product two-dimensional transaction to the three-dimensional transaction of resource-product-carbon emission rights. Faced with the change of trading methods, how the enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain of remanufacturing can cooperate with low-carbon emission reduction in the context of the uncertain low-carbon product sales market and the uncertain waste low-carbon product recycling market is studied in this paper.First, the "mean-variance" is used to describe the risk aversion characteristics of manufacturers, sellers, and third-party recyclers. Secondly, the objective function of expected utility decision making with differentiated weights in three-dimensional trading model is constructed. Then, with the Stackelberg game theory, the game relationship among the node enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain of low-carbon remanufacturing is analyzed, and discusses such important variables as the selling price of low-carbon products, the trading price of carbon emission rights, and the recycling grid of low-carbon waste products, as well as the change rules of expected utility of the node enterprises and the whole chain.Finally, through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, the effects of carbon emissions, sensitivity coefficient of consumer low-carbon products and trading price of carbon emission rights on enterprises at all nodes under three game relations of zero sum, centralized decision-making and cooperative emission reduction are analyzed respectively. It shows that when enterprises cooperate in low-carbon emission reduction, the sales price and wholesale price of low-carbon products both decrease, the market share increases, and the expected utility of sellers and manufacturers both increase, which provides important enlightenment for the government to formulate low-carbon cooperative emission reduction policies. The degree of risk aversion, carbon emissions trading price, carbon emissions and low carbon products for consumers in sensitive coefficient and expected utility node enterprises, low carbon products market share, is a negative relationship, for how to design the relevant parameter, optimizing the low-carbon remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain management and collaborative reduction, has an important guiding role.