摘要
保证客观性是情感主义理论迫切需要解决的问题,休谟的“理想观察者”理论和斯洛特的“半克里普克式的指称固定”理论分别做出了回答。休谟通过“一般观点”下的普遍移情使道德判断独立于个人视角而具有普遍客观性,这在洛克的颜色理论那里有相似论述。斯洛特则在改造克里普克关于颜色的指称固定理论的基础上,说明了道德属性和颜色属性一样具有独立于主观反应的实在性和必然性。不同于颜色属性的是,道德判断可以先天地不依赖于主观经验地识别道德属性,完全走出了相对主义和主观主义。虽然休谟和斯洛特都把道德判断看作人们基于移情的情感反应,但休谟只赋予道德以部分客观性,斯洛特的道德实在论对道德客观性的理解则更为彻底。
How to guarantee objectivity is a critical question that sentimentalism theory needs to solve.It can be answered both by Hume’s“ideal observer”theory and Slote’s“semi-Kripkean reference fixing”theory.Hume uses Human’s common response of empathy under“general point of view”to guarantee the universality and objectivity of moral judgment independent of personal perspective,which is similarly argued in Locke’s color theory.Slote,on the basis of reforming Saul A.Kripke’s color theory of reference fixing,explains the reality and necessity of moral attributes independent of subjective response,just like color;moreover,different from color,moral judgment can innately recognize moral attributes without relying on subjective experience,which completely gets rid of relativism and subjectivism.Comparisons show that,although both Hume and Slote regard moral judgment as an emotional response based on empathy,Hume only partially guarantees moral objectivity,while Slote’s moral realism theory of moral objectivity is more thorough.
作者
张燕
ZHANG Yan(School of Marxism,Ocean University of China,Qingdao,China 266100)
出处
《温州大学学报(社会科学版)》
2020年第2期8-14,共7页
Journal of Wenzhou University:Social Science Edition
基金
中国海洋大学2020年度人文社会科学青年教师科研专项(202013015)。