国有企业控制权转移与控股股东私利

The control transfer of state-owned enterprises and Personal gains of controlling shareholders

本文以产权改革、加快发展混合所有制经济为研究背景,检验国有企业控制权转移对控股股东私利的影响。以2003-2017年我国A股上市国有企业控制权转移为样本,通过多时点双重差分的方法,研究发现国有企业控制权转移后,民营控股股东进行了更多的私利行为,表明了民营控股股东往往以经济利益为先,采用更多的关联交易满足自身经济利益的诉求,符合控制权私人收益的观点。此外,当国有资本继续持股时,民营控股股东进行了相对较少的关联交易,表明国有资本对民营控股股东私利行为起到了一定程度的监督作用,而股权制衡的高低程度都不能显著抑制民营控股股东的私利行为,这也符合我国资本市场"一股独大"的特点,控股股东能够绝对控制公司运作。本文对于理解国企民营化过程中控股股东动机以及深化改革后果有着重要的启示意义。

This paper takes the property-rights reform and the accelerated development of mixed ownership economy as the research background to test the impact of the control transfer of state-owned enterprises on the personal gains of controlling shareholders. Taking the control transfer of state-owned enterprises listed in the A-share market in China from 2003 to 2017 as samples, with the method of multiple-point difference-in-differences, research found that after the control transfer of state-owned enterprises, the private controlling shareholders do more for their personal gains, which indicates that as for the private controlling shareholders, economic benefits come first, and it is is in line with the idea of private benefits of control that they take more related transactions to satisfy their own economic interests. In addition, when stateowned capital continued to hold shares, private controlling shareholders conducted relatively few related transactions, indicating that state-owned capital has played a certain supervision over the making private benefit of private controlling shareholders, which can not significantly suppressed, regardless of the level of equity restriction. This also corresponds with the characteristics of "only one dominant shareholder" in China’s capital market, and the controlling shareholders can absolutely control the operation of the company. This paper has significant implications for understanding the motivation of controlling shareholders in the privatization of state-owned enterprises and deepening the consequences of reform.