农业保险市场中政府行为一致性激励制度设计

Design of the Incentive System for the Consistency of Government Behavior in Agricultural Insurance Market

在农业保险市场中,中央政府和地方政府是农业保险市场中的两个独立行为主体。中央政府和地方政府共同完成对农业保险市场的构建行为,研究各级政府在农业保险市场中制度一致性条件下目标行为的一致性,是研究各级政府研究政府与其他主体行为互动的必要前提,通过农业保险市场的政府的行政立法、行政管理和财政支持等职能作用的阐释,基于委托代理理论,探索设计能够中央政府和地方政府行为一致性的激励机制,有助于加强政府对农业保险市场的治理能力并促进农业保险市场构建。利用委托代理理论研究政府行为一致性的激励机制,将中央政府和地方政府形成目标行为统一体,发现在正负物质激励并结合精神激励的条件下,政府行为一致性成本最低。

In agricultural insurance market,the central government and the local government were two independent behavior subjects.The central government and the local government jointly completed the construction of the agricultural insurance market,and studied the consistency of the target behavior of the governments at all levels under the condition of the system consistency in the agricultural insurance market.It was the necessary premise for the governments at all levels to study the interaction between the government and other subjects.Through the analysis of the functions of the government in the agricultural insurance market,such as the administrative legislation,the administrative management and the financial support,etc.Based on the principal-agent theory,it explored and designed the incentive mechanism that could make the central government and the local government act in accordance,which was helpful to strengthen the government’s governance ability of the agricultural insurance market and promote the construction of the agricultural insurance market.Using the principal-agent theory to study the incentive mechanism of government behavior consistency,the central government and local government form a target behavior unity,and found that the cost of government behavior consistency was the lowest under the condition of positive and negative material incentives combined with spiritual incentives.