地方债搭售合约与发行利率异象

Municipal Bond Tying Contract and Issuance Interest Rate Anomaly

基于要素市场尚未充分市场化以及地方政府对银行具有行政干预能力的基本事实,同时结合地方政府行为动机的不可验证性,本文将我国地方债交易界定为“存在行政干预的搭售合约”,并以此来阐释地方债发行利率异象的形成机制。进一步,利用2015—2018年3824条地方债数据对理论假说进行检验,得到如下结论。第一,在经济互惠影响机制作用下,地方政府所控制的经济资源越多,地方债发行利率异象就越显著。第二,在行政干预影响机制作用下,地方政府干预能力越强,对双方经济互惠搭售合约收益分配比例的扭曲程度就越高。地方政府的财政压力则对行政干预效应具有促进作用。第三,行政干预效应受地区制度质量影响。本文所做的研究既有利于相关政策的完善,也可为金融市场与其他要素市场间内在关联的分析提供启示。

Given that the factor market has yet to fully operate on the market basis,local governments have the ability to intervene in bank decision making and the motives of local governments are not verifiable,this paper defines the municipal bond transaction between local governments and banks as“tying contract with administrative intervention”,and explains the municipal bond issuance interest rate anomalies in China.Furthermore,we use 3824 pieces of municipal bond issuance data from 2015 to 2018 to test the theoretical hypothesis and draw the following conclusions:First,under the influence of economic reciprocity mechanism,the more economic resources the local government controls,the more prominent the anomaly of municipal bond issuance interest rate is.Second,under the influence of the administrative intervention mechanism,the stronger the intervention ability of the local government is,the more distorted the income distribution proportion of the economic reciprocity tying contract is.And fiscal pressure of local government can promote the effect of administrative intervention.Third,the effectiveness of the administrative intervention mechanism decreases with the improvement of institutional quality.This paper is not only conducive to the improvement of relevant policies,but also sheds light on the internal correlation between financial markets and other factor markets.