公租房配租市场设计稳定性探究

Study on Stability of Market Design in Public Rental Housing Matching Market

公租房这类价格失灵的市场,供求配对常被认为难以求到最优解,故配租过程的种种问题常被忽略不计,市场设计的理论和实践为此难题的破解带来了曙光。本文以公租房市场设计的相关理论与实验检验发展为主线,以合作博弈下偏好、不可分割物品的交换及核解为起点,对公租房初分配与再分配市场设计进行了较为系统的梳理、分析与解读。被理论证明在公租房各类市场中,具有良好性能的G-S、RSD与TTC等机制及其衍生机制,实验检验却显示出与理论的稳定性逻辑存在着一定差距,主要分歧在于各机制的无策略性无法在实践中贯彻执行,或许环境的复杂性与认知偏差限制了机制的完美实现,抑或机制本身并非OSP。

There is market failure in public rental housing,the matching of supply and demand is considered to be difficult to obtain the optimal solution,the problems of the process of public rental housing matching are often neglected,but the theory and practice of market design bring light to the solution of these problems.Following the theory and experiment of public rental housing matching,starting with preference in cooperation games and the core with the indivisibility,this paper does systematically works in interpreting the design of the public rental housing matching market from initial allocation to reallocation exchange and redistribution adjustment.Theoretical research proves the superperformance of RSD,TTC and G-S mechanisms,as well as those derivative mechanisms,while experimental tests show that these several mechanisms are not consistent with theories above.Three crucial reasons could explain why there is still a certain gap with the theoretical stability logic the failure to follow through Strategy-Proof in all mechanisms,the limitations of environmental complexity and cognitive deviation,or the mechanisms which are not OSP.