声誉激励与分析师行为--基于新财富最佳分析师评选的实证研究

Reputation Incentive and Analyst Behavior:An Empirical Study Based on the New Wealth Best Analyst Appraisal

本文通过新财富最佳分析师评选取消前后分析师勤勉程度和研报质量的变化,考察了声誉激励对分析师行为的影响。我们从2010-2019年间国内分析师发布的所有股票评级报告中,整理了3.5万份评级调整数据以及3.6万条分析师实地调研记录。我们发现,分析师所做的投资评级调整总体上具有良好的投资参考价值,而上榜"新财富"的明星分析师所做的评级上调(相比一般分析师)能够进一步获得超额收益。但新财富评选取消之后,证券行业分析师的工作勤勉程度和荐股能力都有了显著的下降。这表明,作为中国证券市场上最重要的声誉激励机制,新财富评选能在一定程度上衡量分析师的研究能力,并提高他们的勤勉程度和绩效。

We collected a large dataset of the securities analysts in China during the period from 2010 to 2019,which consists of 36,000 investigations and 35,000 rating adjustments on listed companies.By comparing the changes of analysts'diligence and research quality before and after the elimination of the New Wealth Best Analyst Appraisal,we study the influence of reputation incentive on analysts'behavior.We found that the adjustments of investment ratings made by star analysts are generally of higher reference values than those made by ordinary analysts.After the cancellation of the appraisal,the analysts who originally participated in the appraisal decrease significantly in their diligence and research performance.In contrast,those who were not originally involved in the appraisal show no decrease in either direction.Our results show that the appraisal,as the most important reputation incentive to analysts in China,could measure analysts'research ability and improve their diligence and research performance.