机构持股与上市公司信息披露质量——基于主动型和被动型基金影响差异的视角

Active funds vs.passive funds:The effects of institutional ownership on corporate information disclosure

本文以我国A股上市公司为研究对象,采用2007-2016年半年度开放式基金持股数据,研究主动型基金和被动型基金持股对上市公司信息披露质量影响的差异.研究结果表明,主动型基金持股降低了公司信息披露质量,而被动型基金持股提高了公司信息披露质量.本文采用子样本回归以及工具变量和两阶段最小二乘法控制潜在的内生性等问题,得到了一致稳健的结果.进一步分析发现,主动型基金通过增大市场噪音对信息披露质量产生负面影响,而公司治理的改善是被动型基金提高信息披露质量的主要原因.本研究对资本市场中机构投资者发展目标的制定具有启示意义,监管部门应积极采取措施发展价值型机构投资者,充分发挥其公司治理功能.

This paper examines the different roles in corporate information disclosure for active and passive fund holdings.Using semi-annual open-end fund holding data of the Chinese A-share listed firms from 2007-2016,we find that active fund holdings reduce the quality of information disclosure,and on the contrary,passive fund holdings increase the quality of information disclosure.We get robust results after controlling for potential endogeneity issues using subsample analyses and two-stage least-square regressions.Further analysis indicates that active fund holdings may trigger noise trading and finally play a negative role in corporate information disclosure,and passive fund holdings play a positive role mainly by improving corporate governance.Our findings have important policy implications in capital market development and suggest that market regulators should take active steps to develop long-term institutional investors and encourage them to participate in corporate governance.