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信息公开缠讼司法规制的实效性考察 被引量:4

On the Effectiveness of Judicial Regulation of Vexatious Government Information Disclosure Litigation
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摘要 实证分析表明,法院为规制信息公开缠讼作出的"滥用裁定"遭遇了严重的实效性问题。通过对公民与行政机关在信息公开申请及诉讼中的博弈分析可知,司法规制实效性不足的原因有二:第一,对公民而言,与实施缠讼可获利益相比,滥用裁定的威慑力不足。信息公开缠讼的背后是基础纠纷的待决,是公民试图利用法院压制行政从而谋求基础纠纷利益的策略性行动。而且目前法院对信息公开缠讼的规制措施有限,并未结束当事人对信息公开诉讼的主动发起地位,当事人有动力也有途径发起更多的诉讼。第二,对行政机关而言,司法规制信息公开缠讼本身面临的正当性、合法性疑问,使得行政机关难以跟进法院对公民采取规制措施。2019年新《条例》的出台,可以消解第二个方面的问题。但公民不会停止对基础纠纷利益的追求,法院也将在新的制度环境下回归控权的使命,公民与行政机关的博弈将在新的规则下再度演化。 The empirical analysis shows that the "abuse ruling" made by the court to regulate vexatious government information disclosure litigation has encountered serious effectiveness problems. Through the analysis of the game between citizens and administrative organs in information disclosure application and litigation, we can see that there are two reasons for the lack of effectiveness of judicial regulation: first, for citizens, compared with the benefits of vexatious litigation, the deterrent power of abusing ruling is insufficient. Behind the vexatious government information disclosure litigation is the pending of basic disputes, which is a strategic action that citizens try to use the court to suppress administration and seek the interests of basic disputes. And at present, the court has limited regulatory measures for vexatious government information disclosure litigation, which does not end the active position of the parties to the information disclosure litigation. The parties have the motivation and the way to initiate more litigation. Second, for the administrative organs, the legitimacy and legality of the judicial regulation of vexatious government information disclosure litigation make it difficult for the administrative organs to follow up the court to take regulatory measures against citizens. The introduction of the new regulations in 2019 can solve the second problem. However, citizens will not stop pursuing the interests of basic disputes, and the court will return to the mission of controlling power under the new system environment. The game between citizens and administrative organs will evolve again under the new rules.
作者 肖洒 XIAO Sa(Zhejiang University Guanghua Law School,Hangzhou 310008)
出处 《行政法学研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第3期149-160,共12页 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW
基金 最高人民法院司法案例研究项目“大数据背景下的政府信息公开诉讼案例研究”。
关键词 信息公开 缠讼 权利滥用 实效性 博弈论 Government Information Disclosure Vexatious Litigation Abuse of Administrative Rights Effectiveness of Judicial Regulation Game Theory
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