期刊文献+

基于逆向多属性在线拍卖的工程招投标机制设计研究 被引量:1

Research on Engineering Bidding Mechanism Design Based on Reverse Multi-attribute Online Auction
下载PDF
导出
摘要 为了解决建设工程招投标中工程项目的不公平分配而导致的资源浪费问题,引入多属性拍卖和在线拍卖,设计了一种逆向多属性在线拍卖机制。理论分析表明:该机制允许投标人随时进入和离开拍卖平台;实现招标人即时决策;激励投标人真实报告自己的成本以及到达和离开时间;吸引投标人自愿参与拍卖;使得投标人在一个更为公平的环境下竞争。最后通过一个算例演示该机制在实际中的应用。 In order to solve the problem of resources waste caused by unfair distribution of engineering projects in construction project bidding,this paper introduces multi-attribute auction and online auction,and designs a reverse multi-attribute online auction mechanism.Theoretical analysis shows that the mechanism not only can allow the contractors to enter and leave the auction platform at any time,but also can make real-time decisions.In addition,the mechanism can motivate the contractors to report his own costs and arrival and departure times truly,and attract contractors to participate in the auction voluntarily,thus making the contractors compete on a more level playing field.Finally,an example is given to show how to applicate this mechanism in practice.
作者 王雅娟 吴杰 邵嫄 WANG Yajuan;WU Jie;SHAO Yuan(Evergrande School of Management,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China;Center for Service Science and Engineering,Wuhan University of Science and Technology,Wuhan 430081,China;School of Business Administration,Guangdong University of Finance,Guangzhou 510521,China)
出处 《建筑经济》 北大核心 2020年第6期29-33,共5页 Construction Economy
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71601150,71501147) 湖北省教育厅哲学社会科学研究项目(19Q024) 武汉科技大学服务科学与工程研究中心开放基金项目(CSSE2017KA01)。
关键词 工程招投标 逆向多属性拍卖 在线拍卖 激励相容 个体理性 engineering bidding reverse multi-attribute auction online auction incentive compatibility individual rationality
  • 相关文献

参考文献5

二级参考文献52

  • 1田剑,高攀.多属性逆向拍卖机制设计研究述评[J].管理学家(学术版),2011(5):49-58. 被引量:1
  • 2殷红,王先甲.网上双边拍卖机制设计及其实现[J].系统工程理论与实践,2004,24(10):110-116. 被引量:13
  • 3杜黎,胡奇英.一类网上英式拍卖:顾客投标行为研究[J].管理科学学报,2006,9(3):31-38. 被引量:12
  • 4Vickrey,William.Counterspeculation,auctions,and competitive sealed tenders[J].The Journal of finance,1961:9-37.
  • 5Roger B Myerson."Optimal Auction Design"[J].Mathematics of Operations Research,1981(6):58-73.
  • 6John G..Riley and William F.Samuelson."Optimal Auction"[J].The American Economic Review,1981(71):381-392.
  • 7Yossi Sheffi.Combinatorial auctions in the procurement of transportation services[J].Interfaces,2004,34(4):245-252.
  • 8Leandro Arozamena and Estelle Cantillon.Investment Incentives in Procurement auctions[J].Review of Economic Studies,2004(71):1-18.
  • 9Rachel R.Chen,Robin O.Roundy,Rachel Q.Zhang and Ganesh Janakiraman.Efficient auction mechanisms for supply chain procurement[J].Management Science,2005,51(3):467-482.
  • 10Wedad Elmaghraby.The importance of ordering in sequential auctions[J].Management Science,2003,49(5):473-482.

共引文献49

同被引文献9

引证文献1

二级引证文献1

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部