高校内部治理路径创新与结构优化研究--基于委托代理理论的分析框架

Innovation and Structural Optimization of Internal Governance Paths in Universities Based on Principal-Agent Theory

中国高校内部治理在高等教育体制改革的框架内历经探索尝试、逐步深化和加速发展等阶段渐趋成熟。在高等教育内涵式发展的进程中,高校内部治理仍存在诸多的冲突与矛盾,并以办学同质化、体制凝固化、培养脱节化的形式外显于高等教育的发展过程中。作为一种特殊的社会组织,中国高校是由政治权力、行政权力、学术权力以及民主权利等多种力量共同作用所形成的一种复杂组织结构,其内部存在着多元利益主体及利益诉求。在治理的视域下,这些不同的权力/权利主体及利益主体之间形成了特殊的委托代理关系。借鉴委托代理理论的一般分析方法和框架,协调高校内部治理中的利益冲突、激发高校发展内生动力需从政府简政放权、破除外部束缚和高校自我完善、健全平衡机制两个方面着手。

Within the framework of higher education system reform,the internal governance of Chinese colleges and universities has gradually matured through exploration,trial,deepening and accelerated development.There are multiple interest subjects and interest claims within it.From the perspective of governance,a special principal-agent relationship is formed between these different power subjects and interest subjects.Based on the method of general analysis and framework of the principal-agent theory,the coordination of those conflicts and motivation of the endogenous impetus for the development should start with the government simplification and decentralization,removal of external constraints and college self-improvement,and improvement of the balance mechanism.