基于组合双向拍卖的共享储能机制研究

Energy Storage Sharing Mechanism Based on Combinatorial Double Auction

为满足共享储能中储能用户的互补性和替代性需求、解决常规单向拍卖中可能存在的垄断竞争问题,提出了基于组合双向拍卖的共享储能机制。在该机制中,储能运营商和储能用户在拍卖商的组织下进行组合双向拍卖。拍卖包含四个阶段:投标、竞胜标决定问题、资源匹配与定价、资金结算。相较于现有拍卖机制,该机制支持"与"投标,使得买家的互补性需求得以准确而简洁地表达。在竞胜标决定问题方面,建立了以社会福利最大化为目标的混合整数非线性规划模型。进一步,将该模型等价转化为混合整数线性规划模型,大幅降低了计算时间复杂度。在定价方面,提出了在买卖双方之间均分社会福利的定价机制,打破了传统单向拍卖的垄断弊端。最后,通过算例验证了所提机制的有效性。

In order to meet the complementary and substitutable demands of energy storage users in energy storage sharing and solve the monopoly competition problem that may exist in the conventional single auction, an energy storage sharing mechanism based on combinatorial double auction is proposed. In this mechanism, the energy storage operators and the energy storage users conduct combinatorial double auctions under the organization of an auctioneer. The auction consists of four stages: bidding, winner determining, resource matching and pricing, and capital settling. Compared with the existing auction mechanism, this mechanism supports AND bidding format, so that the complementary demands of the buyers can be expressed accurately and concisely. In terms of winner determination problem, a mixed integer nonlinear programming model aiming at social welfare maximization is established. Furthermore, this established mixed integer linear programming model greatly reduces the complexity of the computational time. In terms of pricing, the pricing mechanism of distributing social welfare equally between buyers and sellers is proposed, which breaks the monopoly abuse of the traditional one-way auction. Finally, an example is given to verify the effectiveness of the proposed mechanism.