摘要
以2012~2017年A股上市制造企业为研究对象,研究创新投入与成本粘性相互影响关系,并加入管理层能力作为调节变量分析研究管理层能力在二者之间的调节作用。实证检验发现:创新投入能正向增加成本粘性,同时成本粘性也在一定程度上正向促进企业创新投入水平;管理层能力能在组织内部发挥积极作用,能抑制成本粘性,但由于管理层谨慎性原因也会降低创新投入水平;管理层能力能负向调节创新投入对于成本粘性的促进作用,但同时也会负向调节成本粘性对创新投入的促进作用。进一步研究发现:股权激励能负向缓解管理层能力对创新投入的抑制作用,促进创新投入水平的提高,但薪酬激励的调节作用不明显。
2012~2017 A-share listed manufacturing enterprises as the research object,this paper studies the interaction between innovation input and cost stickiness,and analyzes the regulatory role of management capacity in the two by adding management capacity as the regulatory variable.The empirical test shows:innovation input can increase cost stickiness positively,and cost stickiness can also promote the level of enterprise innovation input to a certain extent;management ability can play a positive role in the organization,and can inhibit cost stickiness,but it can also reduce the level of innovation input due to the reason of management prudence;management ability can negatively regulate the cost stickiness of innovation input At the same time,the ability of management can also negatively adjust the cost stickiness to promote innovation investment.Further research shows that equity incentive can negatively alleviate the inhibition of management ability on innovation investment and promote the improvement of innovation investment level,but the regulation of compensation incentive is not obvious.
作者
晁胜林
尹宗成
CHAO Sheng-lin;YIN Zong-cheng(School of Economics and Management,Anhui Agricultural University,Heifei 230036,Anhui,China)
出处
《安徽工业大学学报(社会科学版)》
2020年第1期21-24,共4页
Journal of Anhui University of Technology:Social Sciences
基金
全国统计科学研究重点项目(2018LZ12)
安徽高校人文社会科学研究重点项目(SK2017A0139)
安徽农业大学研究生创新基金项目(2019yjs-82)。
关键词
成本粘性
创新投入
管理层能力
股权激励
薪酬激励
cost stickiness
innovation input
management capacity
equity incentive
salary incentive