国有上市公司高管“限薪令”的潜在问题与改进建议

Potential Problems and Improvement Suggestions of "Pay Ceiling Order" for Executives of State-owned Listed Companies

国有企业负责人薪酬制度改革是国有企业建立现代企业制度的重要组成部分,也是此轮国有企业改革的重点任务之一。本研究选择2005—2016年上市公司数据为样本,对比检验了2009年和2015年出台的“限薪令”在国有企业的实施效果及其对公司业绩的影响。研究发现:2015年“限薪令”对国有企业高管货币薪酬的限制效应更强,且在地方国有企业表现更为显著;高管货币薪酬水平和高管持股比例分别与公司业绩呈显著正相关关系;硬性的限薪方式对国有上市公司业绩具有一定的负面效应。调整和优化国有企业高管薪酬制度,不能仅依靠行政化的薪酬管制,还应该适当性增加股权激励在薪酬结构中的比重,加快建立管理层股权激励和约束的长效机制,从而实现国有企业的长远发展。

The reform of the salary system for the heads of state-owned enterprises is an important part of the establishment of a modern enterprise system for state-owned enterprises,and it is also one of the key tasks of this round of state-owned enterprise reform.This study selects the data of listed companies from 2005 to 2016 as the sample,and comparatively examines the implementation effect of the"pay ceiling order"issued in 2009 and 2015 in state-owned enterprises and its impact on company performance.The study finds that the"pay ceiling order 2015"has a stronger restrictive effect on the monetary compensation of state-owned enterprise executives,and it is more prominent in local stateowned enterprises;the rigid ways of limiting salary has a certain negative effect on the performance of state-owned listed companies.Adjusting and optimizing the pay system of state-owned enterprise executives can not only rely on administrative salary control,but also can appropriately increase the proportion of equity incentives in the pay structure.Meanwhile,the establishment of a long-term mechanism for equity incentives and constraints of management can be accelerated,and thus realize the long-term development of state-owned enterprises.