电商背景下供应链金融风险的监管机制

Supervisory Mechanism of Supply Chain Financial Risk in the Era of E-commerce

在线供应链金融业务在近几年得到了快速的发展,同时银行也面临着监管与风险控制问题。本文运用演化博弈方法研究了在委托—代理模式下,当银行委托电商平台对融资企业进行授信管理时的银行监管问题。研究表明,当银行与电商平台各自付出的成本都较高时,双方都没有动力参与到业务中,此时互联网供应链金融业务很有可能走向失败;另外,双方能否合作成功与初始时刻选择合作的博弈方数量也密切相关。

Online supply chain finance has developed rapidly in recent years,while banks also faces supervision problems and risk management.By using approach of evolutionary game,this paper studies the bank supervision problems when the bank entrusts online platform to manage the credit of financing enterprises under the principal-agent model.The study finds that both the bank and e-commerce platform have no motivation to participate in the business when they cost much.And it is possible for online supply chain financial businesses to make failure;in addition,whether the bank and the platform can cooperate successfully is also closely related to the number of players who choose to cooperate at the beginning.