选择性产业政策如何影响企业绩效--来自高新技术企业资质认定的经验证据

How Does Selective Industrial Policy Affect Business Performance?Empirical Evidence from the Qualification of High-tech Enterprises

以高企资质认定政策为准自然实验,通过构建渐进双重差分模型,检验了该政策影响企业绩效的作用效果与微观机理。研究发现,高企资质认定政策显著抑制了高新技术企业的企业绩效,影响的方向和程度则取决于外部市场与政府的调节作用,地区过度竞争与政府过度干预不利于提升高企资质认定政策的实施效果,相反,提升地区市场化与行业市场化程度有助于更好地发挥政策效果。研究还发现,高企资质认定政策的实施一方面导致了高新技术企业的"高投资、低效率"问题,另一方面引致了高新技术企业的研发操纵行为。本研究不仅揭示了当下选择性产业政策实施的困境,而且厘清了可能造成选择性产业政策产生扭曲效应的作用机理,对于进一步完善中国产业政策的制定具有重要的启示意义。

Taking the high-level enterprise qualification policy as a quasi-natural experiment,the paper aims to test the effect and micro-mechanism of high-level enterprise qualification policy on corporate performance through a progressive double difference model. It is found that compared with non-high-tech enterprises,the high-tech qualification certification policy significantly inhibits the performance of high-tech enterprises;however,the direction and degree of high-tech qualification certification policies affecting corporate performance also depend on the regulatory role of external markets and the government;excessive regional competition and excessive government intervention are not conducive to improving the effectiveness of high-level enterprise qualification policy;on the contrary,increasing the degree of regional marketization and industrial marketization will help to better exert the policy effects of high-level enterprise qualification policy. It is also concluded that the implementation of the high-enterprise qualification policy on the one hand led to the"high investment and low efficiency"problem of high-tech enterprises,and on the other hand caused the R & D manipulation behavior of high-tech enterprises. The findings not only reveal the current dilemma of the implementation of selective industrial policies,but also clarify the mechanism that may cause distortion effects of selective industrial policies,which has important implications for further improving China’s industrial policy formulation.