公平偏好下绿色供应链收益分享与绿色创新投入

Revenue sharing and green innovation investment of green supply chain under fairness preference

将公平偏好理论应用到绿色供应链绿色创新投入问题的研究中,建立以F-S模型为基础的绿色制造商与供应商的收益模型,并分析在信息不对称条件下公平偏好对供应商绿色创新、收益分享比例、固定补贴以及制造商最优效用的影响.研究结果表明:在信息不对称条件下,公平偏好对供应商的最优绿色创新投入无影响,公平偏好不会影响绿色制造商提供的最优收益分享比例,而绿色制造商提供给供应商的补贴会受公平偏好影响,绿色制造商给供应商的固定补贴额是随着供应商公平偏好心理强度的增大而减小,而绿色制造商的最优效用会受到供应商公平偏好强度和自身公平偏好强度的共同影响.

Applying the theory of fairness preference to the research on green innovation investment of green supply chain,the income model of green manufacturers and suppliers is established based on the F-S model, and the fair preference for suppliers’ green innovation, revenue sharing ratio, fixed subsidy, as well as the impact of the manufacturer’s optimal utility under the condition of asymmetric information are analyzed. The results show that under the condition of information asymmetry, fairness preference has no influence on the optimal green innovation investment of suppliers, and does not affect the optimal income sharing ratio provided by green manufacturers, and the subsidies of green suppliers provided by green manufacturers are affected by fairness preferences, and the fixed subsidies given by green manufacturers to suppliers are reduced as the supplier’s fairness preference increases, while the green manufacturer’s optimal utility is subjected to the fair preference intensity of green suppliers and the combined influence of the strength of their own fairness preferences.