不同权力结构下闭环供应链CSR分摊机制及定价策略

Corporation social responsibility apportionment mechanism and pricing strategy for closed-loop supply chain under different power structures

研究不同权力结构下具有企业社会责任(CSR)的闭环供应链定价决策问题.探讨Stackelberg博弈及Nash非合作博弈下各成员企业的CSR最优分摊机制及定价策略,分析CSR行为对新产品定价及废旧产品回收的影响.研究表明,无论在何种权力结构下,闭环供应链成员企业的CSR行为都有利于降低新产品零售价格、扩大新产品市场需求以及提高废旧产品回收率,同时也有利于实现零售商、制造商以及闭环供应链系统整体追求社会福利的最大化.通过比较3种权力结构下的均衡结果发现:在零售商主导下的废旧产品回收效果最好,而在Nash非合作博弈下的新产品零售价格最低并且市场需求量最高;零售商和制造商在追求社会福利最大化时获取的总效益在自身主导的权力结构下均是最大的.

The pricing decision problems for closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility(CSR)under different power structures are studied.The optimal CSR apportionment mechanism and pricing strategy of member enterprises under Stackelberg game and Nash noncooperative game are discussed.The effect of member enterprises’CSR behavior to the pricing of new products and the recycling of waste products are analyzed.It shows that no matter under what power structures,the CSR behavior of member enterprise is conducive to expanding the market demand of new products and improving the return rate of waste products,and is also conducive to maximizing the social welfare of retailer,manufacturer and the whole closed-loop supply chain system.By comparing the optimal equilibrium results under the three power structures,the recycling effect of waste products is best under the dominant retailer power structure.And in the Nash noncooperative game,the new product has the lowest retail price and the highest market demand.Finally,the total benefits that the retailer and manufacturer obtain when pursuiting maximization of social welfare are the largest under their own dominant channel structure.