同侪效应:地方政府竞争对城市建设用地扩张的影响

Peer Effects:The Impact of Local Government Competition on Urban Construction Land Expansion

地方政府竞争是理解中国城市建设用地扩张机制的关键,对于推进城市理性发展有重要意义。本文分析了不同层级地方政府间的竞争及其产生的"同侪效应"对城市建设用地扩张的理论影响,并构建计量经济模型,运用2000-2015年中国大陆24个省及自治区的面板数据,从省级区域及其内部两个层面分别验证了地方政府竞争对城市建设用地扩张的同侪效应:一方面区域内部经济发展差距的扩大会加剧地方政府"左顾右盼"式竞争,从而导致更多的城市建设用地扩张:另一方面区域间经济发展的位次排名亦会加大地方政府的政绩压力,从而引致更多的城市建设用地扩张;此外,地方政府竞争对于城市建设用地扩张的同侪效应也存在明显的区域异质性。论文最后从完善相关政策机制和引导地方政府理性竞争的角度,提出了有助于城市建设用地有序扩张的相关建议。

Local government competition is the key to understanding the mechanism of urban construction land expansion in China,and is of great significance for promoting the rational development of cities.This paper analyzes the theoretical impact of the competition between local governments at different levels and the“peer effect”on urban construction land expansion;on this basis,through the construction of econometric models,and the use of 24 provinces and regions in China's Mainland from 2000 to 2015 panel data,from the provincial level and its internal two levels,respectively verified the similar effect of local government competition on urban construction land expansion:on the one hand,the expansion of the regional internal economic development gap will intensify local government competition,resulting in more expansion of urban construction land.On the other hand,interregional economic development rank will also increase the pressure on the local government's performance,which will lead to more urban construction land expansion.In addition,there is obvious regional heterogeneity in the peer effect of local government competition on the expansion of urban construction land.At the end of the thesis,from the perspective of improving relevant policy mechanisms and guiding local governments to rational competition,the paper puts forward relevant suggestions that contribute to the orderly expansion of urban construction land.