组群内多市场接触、移动壁垒高度与企业创新绩效

A Research on Within Group Multimarket Competition,Mobile Barriers Height and Firm Innovation Performance

以往对多市场竞争研究关注的是多市场接触会减弱企业间的竞争行为,提高企业财务绩效。本文对这一观点进行了两方面的延伸:第一,提出多市场接触不仅影响产品市场中企业的竞争行为和绩效,还会影响要素市场中企业的创新绩效。第二,整合了动态竞争的多市场竞争和战略组群研究,预测多市场接触对创新绩效的影响取决于企业所属战略组群的移动壁垒高度。文章对2017年度Pharm Exec(《美国医药经理人》)杂志公布的全球制药行业TOP30企业2007-2017年的数据分析表明,多市场接触对企业的创新绩效有正向影响,围绕战略组群的移动壁垒高度会强化多市场接触与企业创新绩效之间的正向关系。更具体地说,多市场接触对企业创新绩效的正向影响在高移动壁垒下更大,随着围绕战略组群移动壁垒高度的降低,多市场接触对创新绩效的正向影响逐渐减弱。

Previous studies on multimarket competition stated that if two firms contacted in multiple markets,the level of rivalry between them in downstream activities decreased,which,in turn,improved their financial performance.This article extends this perspective in two ways.First,we propose that multimarket contact affects not only the downstream rivalry and performance,but also innovation performance in upstream.Second,by integrating the study of multimarket competition and strategic group,we conjecture that the influence of multimarket contact on innovation performance depends on the mobility barriers height of strategic groups which the firm belongs to.We argue that multimarket contact increases innovation performance since R&D market provides a strategic approach for firms to transfer resources and competitive pressure without intensifying competition in product market.Moreover,by maintaining the stability and profitability of the strategic group,higher mobility barriers height ensures the continuity of this transfer,thus strengthen the positive relationship between multimarket contact and innovation performance.Data from the global pharmaceutical industry support these arguments.We find that multimarket contact has a positive impact on the innovation performance,and mobility barriers height strengthens this positive relationship,which means multimarket contact positively affects the competition in R&D market,but this positive effect decays with the decrease of mobility barriers height.This paper makes four contributions to the literature of dynamic competition.First,the result of this paper shows that the consequence of dynamic competition between firms may not only destroy competitors through a series of actions and counter-actions.Sometimes these competitive interactions are beneficial for both sides.Multimarket contact leads competition in R&D market,which appears to be competitive,but in fact,the result is a continued monopoly of future product markets by these competing firms.Because sustained high innovation performance leads to high barriers to entry for outsiders of the strategic group,which will ensure the continuous success of competing firms.Second,by turning our attention of competition from downstream to upstream,this paper finds a competitive effect of multimarket contact,which indicates that the traditional mutual forbearance hypothesis may not valid in the upstream,thus extends the research on the consequences of multimarket contact.Third,this paper integrates two branches of dynamic competition,multimarket competition and strategic group,therefore represents a more integrated study of dynamic competition.Fourth,this study investigates the key moderating effect of mobility barriers height on the relationship between multimarket contact and innovation performance.To sum up,in previous literature,the most basic and extensive function of mobility barriers is to prevent firms from moving from one group to another and maintain the performance differences among strategic groups.This paper combines mobility barriers height with multimarket competition,and considers that mobility barriers height as a factor that can strengthen the familiarity and mutual forbearance mechanisms behind multimarket contact.Thus,the paper provides a deeper understanding of mobility barriers.