再制造闭环供应链系统担保策略研究

Warranty Strategies in a Closed Loop Supply Chain with Remanufacturing

由于当前环境保护及资源有限的急迫性,世界各国越来越重视可持续发展和循环经济,这促使企业投入到产品的再制造中来.基于消费者对新产品和再制造产品具有不同的支付意愿,考虑了再制造产品的担保策略,在消费者效用函数中并入担保因素的影响,构建了以制造商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,研究了再制造产品的担保策略以及不同的责任主体提供此种服务时对市场份额和利润的影响,并给出了相关结论.研究结果表明:对再制造产品提供担保能提高此产品的接受度,增加市场份额,进而可以提高厂商的利润,推动再制造业的发展;且零售商具有接近消费者的天然优势,由零售商提供此种担保时,运行效率更高.

The importance of the environmental performance products and processes for sustainable manufacturing is increasingly recognized,which leads many enterprises to focus on remanufacturing.Based on the WTP(willingness to pay)differentiation for remanufactured products,we consider a game model with a single manufacturer and a single retailer,in which the consumer utility function is introduced.In this paper we incorporate the product warranty into the model,and aim to analyze the influence of consumer behavior on the market share and profit.Finally,the relevant conclusions are given.Our results show that the warranty strategy for remanufactured products can enhance the WTP for remanufactured products and also boost the market share.It is indeed a profit behavior.