摘要
意识上传不仅是科幻作品的常见题材,也成了哲学家关于后人类、赛博格和超级人工智能等未来场景的终极想象。然而科幻场景的可设想性,并不顺理成章地等同于现实的可能性,这既牵涉到意识的形而上学基础问题,又受到脑与认知科学相关的经验事实的约束。基于大卫·查默斯为心灵上传话题设置的讨论框架,本文论证指出:第一,意识上传的形而上学基础是计算主义,但是在这个问题上,意识上传将会陷入一个两难困境;第二,心灵上传并不等同于意识上传,更不能保证人格同一性的维系;第三,不仅人类的意识无法上传,受制于我们生物性大脑的工作模式,意识下载也难以实现。
Mind or consciousness uploading has long been a topic in scientific fictions.It is nevertheless scenarios for phi-losophers who were enthusiastic about futurism.However,to conceive scenarios like consciousness uploading does not en-sure that it will become actual in future,or not even metaphysically possible.In this paper,based on Chalmers’philosoph-ical analysis of mind uploading,I propose three theses.First,when the computationalist assumption for mind uploading meets with the topic,the conceived scenarios will fall into a dilemma.Second,even if consciousness uploading is possible,the maintenance of personality identity is not guaranteed.Last but not least,due to the biological functional features of brains,even consciousness downloading is hopeless.
作者
王球
WANG Qiu(School of Philosophy,Fudan University,Shanghai,200433)
出处
《科学.经济.社会》
2020年第2期8-13,共6页
Science Economy Society
基金
“上海市浦江人才计划”(项目号18PJC078)、“复旦大学人文社科青年融合创新团队项目”的支持。
关键词
意识上传
人格同一性
赛博格
人工智能
计算主义
Consciousness Uploading
Personal Identity
Cyborg
Artificial Intelligence
Computationalism