摘要
1801年,黑格尔在自己第一部公开印刷的作品《费希特与谢林哲学体系的差别》中对施莱尔马赫的情感和直观概念提出了哲学批评。事实上,黑格尔在成为严格意义上的哲学家之前,就已经在宗教历史维度发现了情感概念的有限性。这两种看法一并体现在1802年的《信仰与知识》中。在黑格尔看来,施莱尔马赫忽视了两个问题:首先,被动的宗教情感只能作为个体,而无法作为伦理共同体起作用;情感性宗教所达到的和解,只是或许会以小社团的方式实现的原子式和解,而不是“精神”意义上整体性和解。其次,《论宗教》既没有在技术上把直观和反思以有机的方式组织起来,也没有提供解决问题的思路;反思总是停留在直观和情感之外,并对之构成限制。
In 1801,Hegel gave his philosophical criticism of Schleiermacher's“feeling”and“intuition”in his first publicly printed work The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy.In fact,before becoming a philosopher in a strict sense,Hegel had discovered the finiteness of the concept of feeling in the dimension of religious history.These two points of views were reflected in Hegel's Faith and Knowledge.In his view,Schleiermacher neglected two problems:first,passive religious feelings can only function as individuals instead of ethical communities;emotional religions may possibly reach atomic reconciliation in the sense of small associations,but it cannot reach holistic reconciliation in the sense of Spirit.Secondly,On Religion neither technically organizes intuition and reflection in an organic way,nor provides ideas for solving this problem;reflection always stays outside of intuition and feeling and thus limits them.
作者
成果
CHENG Guo(Peking University,Beijing 100871,China)
出处
《云南大学学报(社会科学版)》
北大核心
2020年第4期30-36,共7页
The Journal of Yunnan University:Social Sciences Edition