摘要
银企关系在信贷资源配置中发挥着重要作用,然而现有研究大多仅着眼于单方面的企业对银行贷款的需要,而忽视了银企双向互动关系中银行对企业存款的诉求。本文基于中国利率市场化的制度背景,首次从上市公司购买银行理财产品的独特视角考察银企关系对银行获取企业(类)存款资金的影响。研究发现,相较于非关系银行,上市公司向关系银行购买的理财金额更高,而理财收益率更低。在做了一系列内生性和稳健性检验后,上述结果依然成立。基于银企相对地位的横截面检验表明,银企关系与理财收益率的负向关系程度在银行类型分别为大型国有商业银行、全国性股份制商业银行、地方性商业银行时依次递减,在企业持股银行情况分别为未持股银行、持股非关系银行、持股关系银行时依次递减,而在企业产权性质为民营企业时比国有企业时更强。进一步研究发现,基于银企关系签订的委托理财契约有利于企业维系与关系银行的信贷关系,持续地获取信贷资源的支持。最后,结合实体经济金融化的研究表明,企业向关系银行购买理财产品短期性地挤占了实体投资,而随着银企关系的深入,信贷资源的保障自然地化解了投资不足问题。本文的研究揭示了银企间双向互动的动态过程,为理解实体经济"脱实向虚"现象提供了崭新的视角,对于决策部门深化改革、促进生产要素市场化配置也具有重要启示。
Bank-enterprise relationship plays an important role in allocation of bank loan resources.However,literatures mainly focus on firms’demand on banks’loans but ignore banks’demand on firms’deposits in the bank-enterprise interaction.In the background of interest rate liberalization in China,this paper is the first time to study the impact of lending relationship on the banks’access to firms’deposits from the unique perspective of listed firms purchasing wealth management products(WMPs)from banks.This paper finds that WMPs’amount is higher and yield rate is lower when WMPs are purchased from relationship banks than non-relationship banks.The results are robust to a series of endogenous tests and robustness tests.Cross-sectional tests based on the relative position of banks and firms indicate that the negative relation between lending relationship and WMPs’yield rate weakens successively when banks are big SOE banks,joint-equity banks and local banks respectively,or when firms do not hold banks’ownership,only hold ownership of non-relationship banks and hold ownership of relationship banks respectively,or when firms are non-SOEs and SOEs respectively.Additional tests indicate that firms benefit from WMPs contracting with relationship banks,which means firms maintain lending relationship and get persistent loans.Lastly,combined with the researches on the financialization of the real economy,purchasing WMPs from relationship banks crowds out firms’capital investments but this effect is alleviated due to persistent loans acquisition from relationship banks afterwards.This paper not only opens the black box of the dynamic progress of bank-enterprise interaction,but also provides new insights on the financialization of the real economy.It also has important enlightenment for decision makers to deepen reform to promote market allocation of factors of production.
作者
褚剑
胡诗阳
CHU Jian;HU Shi-yang(School of Business of Nanjing University,Nanjing 210093,China;School of Eeonomics and Business Adninistation of Chongqing Univeriy,Chonging 4004 China)
出处
《中国工业经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第6期155-173,共19页
China Industrial Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目“利率市场化,监管套利与资源配置——银行理财产品发行及购买的影响因素和经济后果研究”(批准号71802029)
国家自然科学基金青年项目“证券监管处罚对未违规高管的间接威慑效应:基于高管社会关系网络视角的研究”(批准号71902085)。
关键词
银企关系
银企互动
理财产品
利率市场化
金融化
bank-enterprise relationship
bank-enterprise interaction
wealth management products
interest rate liberalization
financialization