基于博弈的私营-公有混合路网定价

Pricing of a private-public hybrid road network based on game theory

对"私营-公有"混合路网的收费博弈问题进行了研究并建立了模型,理论推导和证明了在由私营企业和公有企业控制的平行路网中,私营-公有企业收费博弈的均衡解的存在性和性质,比较了不同的博弈模式对社会福利、收费、流量等的影响.研究结果表明:寡头博弈下各路段将收取最高的费用,产生最低的总出行流量和社会福利;社会最优福利博弈各路段的收费最低,但是流量和社会福利最高;混合博弈的收费、总出行流量和社会福利介于其他2种博弈之间.最后通过算例探讨了平行路网中所有路段为对称时不同博弈模式的效率.

In this paper,a game analysis of"private-public"mixed road network charges was performed.A model was established to theoretically deduce and prove the existence and nature of an equilibrium solution of game analysis of the charges of private-public enterprises for a parallel road network controlled by them.Additionally,the influence of different game models on social welfare,charge,traffic,etc.was compared.In the oligarch game,the highest fee will be charged for each road section,resulting in the lowest total travel flow and social welfare;in the social optimal welfare game,the lowest fee will be charged for each road section,but the total travel flow and social welfare will be the highest;in the mixed game,the fee,total travel flow and social welfare will lie between those of the other two games.Finally,the efficiency of different game models was discussed when all the road sections in a parallel network are symmetrical.