直觉在哲学讨论中被用为证据吗?——对克莱门哈贾论证的批评

Are Intuitions used as Evidence in Philosophical Discussions: A Critical Analysis on Climenhaga’s Argument

关于直觉在哲学讨论中的论证效用的争论近年来开始进入到分析哲学学界的视野中。为此,嘉比林提出了"中心性论点",将这一争论作为一个严格的"元哲学"或方法论问题引入到哲学论域中。许多学者认为,在哲学讨论中作为证据的乃是直觉性命题,而非直觉状态本身,但克莱门哈贾则坚持认为直觉状态本身就已作为证据。尽管他的解释思路有力地拓展了中心性问题的理论空间,并为中心性问题的回答提供了全新的视角和解释可能,但其论证并不成功,他终究无法在此问题中弥合命题态度与命题之间的范畴类型间隙,故而也无法成功地为中心性论点做出辩护。

The debate about the use of intuitions in philosophical discussion has come into the horizon of analytical philosophy in recent years. In order to introduce the debate into the philosophical field as a strict meta-philosophy or methodological problem, Cappelen put forward the centrality thesis. Many scholars have argued that it is the intuitive proposition, rather than the intuitive state itself, that serves as evidence in philosophical discussions, but Climenhaga insists that the intuitive state itself serves as evidence. Although his interpretation has expanded the theoretical depth of the centrality question effectively, and provided a new perspective and explanation for the question, his argument is not successful. He cannot eventually bridge the gap of categorical genera between propositions and propositional attitudes, thus can’t successfully defended the centrality thesis.