摘要
我国有不少上市公司实施股权激励,意图将管理层目标与企业目标合二为一或者留住企业发展所需核心、关键人才,但也存在变“激励”为管理层“福利”的现象。本文采用制造业2009—2018年的数据对股权激励计划与真实盈余管理的关系进行实证分析,初步得出股权激励方式、行权(解锁)难度、股权激励程度等与真实盈余管理水平存在显著相关关系,实施股权激励公司的管理层出于不同目的或多或少地会进行真实盈余管理。
Many listed companies in China implement equity incentives,intending to combine management goals with corporate goals or to retain core and key talents needed for corporate development,but there are also those that change“incentives”into management“welfare”phenomenon.This article uses the data of manufacturing industry from 2009 to 2018 to conduct an empirical analysis of the relationship between the equity incentive plan and the real earnings management.It is preliminarily concluded that the equity incentive method,exercise(unlocking)difficulty,and equity incentive level are significantly related to the real earnings management level.Relationship,the management of companies implementing equity incentives will more or less manage real earnings for different purposes.
作者
肖新棠
Xiao Xintang(Nanjing Audit University,Nanjing 211815,Jiangsu)
出处
《江苏商论》
2020年第7期103-108,共6页
Jiangsu Commercial Forum
关键词
股权激励模式
真实盈余管理
上市公司
equity incentive model
real earnings management
listed companies