政府审计与银行贷款定价

Government Auditing and Bank Loan Pricing

以2009〜2015年接受政府审计的中央企业集团下属上市公司为样本,借助手工收集的单笔银行贷款数据,本文围绕政府审计与银行贷款定价的关系进行探索。结果显示:政府审计的警示效应大于治理效应,政府审计后公司银行贷款的利率水平显著上升;政府审计对贷款利率的影响与审计中发现的违法违规问题严重程度有关,违法违规问题越严重,政府审计后贷款利率的上升越明显。进一步的检验显示:二次政府审计强化了警示效应;对于国有银行来源的贷款,政府审计的警示影响更大;政府审计对信用贷款的形式影响显著。研究扩展了政府审计经济后果的研究,也从政府监督的角度丰富了银行贷款定价因素的研究,对于我国未来的政府监管改革、信贷决策效率提升具有一定的现实意义。

As an important part of the regulatory system reform,government audit deserves attention in terms of its influence on bank loan contracts.Based on the listed companies(audited from 2008 to 2015)affiliated to the central state-owned enterprises,this paper studies the relationship between government audit and bank loans'pricing based on manually collected data of bank loans.The empirical results show that:(1)The warning effect dominates the governance effect.After government audit,companies bear higher interest rates・(2)The influence of government audit on loan pricing is related to the degree of violations.The more serious the violation,the stronger the relationship.In addition,government audit conducted for the second time enhances the warning effect and leads to a higher interest rate.The warning effect is more significant in loans from state banks.The government audit also has notable effects on the amount and terms of loans.This paper expands the study of the economic consequences of the government audit,and enriches the research on factors of bank loan pricing from the perspective of government supervision.Moreover,it provides reference for the future reform of government audit and promoting the efficiency of bank loan contracts in China.